




Patient Safety

Marc J. Shapiro M.D.

Brown Medical School

Rhode Island Hospital Medical Simulation Center



National Institute of Medicine report 1999

Significance of Medical Error

- 44,000 - 98,000 deaths per year
 - 3 jumbo jets crashing every other day
 - 5th leading cause of death
 - More in 6 months than in Vietnam
- Annual cost 37-50 billion dollars

Five Precepts for Error Management

(Helmreich and Merritt, *Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine*)

- Human Error is inevitable in complex systems
- Limitation of human performance imposed by cognitive capabilities
- High workload and stress increase error
- Safety is a universal value but there is a continuum. How much safety we want and what can we afford?
- High Risk Organizations must develop a safety culture to make individuals and teams responsible

Error, stress and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys crews

(Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich, RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional. BMJ 2000; March 18;320:745-749)

- Medicine more likely to deny the effects of stress and fatigue
 - medical personnel 60% vs. cockpit crew 26%
- Staff did not acknowledge they make mistakes
- Surgeons more likely than intensivists and pilots to advocate hierarchies
 - surgeons 45% vs. intensivists 6% and pilots 3%

Clinician Attitudes About Teamwork

- **Operating Room** (*Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich, RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional. BMJ 2000; March 18;320:745-749*)
 - Only 55% of consultant surgeons rejected steep hierarchies
 - Minority of Anesthesia and Nursing reported high levels of teamwork
- **Critical Care** (*Surgenor SD, Mlike GT, Corwin HL. Teamwork and collaboration in critical care: Lessons from the cockpit. Crit Care Med. 2003; March;31(3): 992-993*)
 - Discrepant attitudes between physician and nurses about teamwork
 - 73% physicians “High” or “Very High”
 - 33% nurses “High” or “Very High”

2001 AAMC Policy Statement

- 80 hour week maximum
- No more than 24 continuous hours
 - emergency medicine and critical care only 12 hours
- 8 hours between duty shifts
- Maximum call 1 in 3
- Day off every seven

<http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/nov01/gme.htm>

What is a Medical Error?

“An act or omission that would have been judged wrong by knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred”

Institute of Medicine

Other Definitions

- **Sentinel Event**

- An unexpected incident involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or risk thereof.

Example: Incompatible blood given to a patient resulting in death.

- **Incident**

- Error makes it to the patient
- Does not require harm


- **Near Miss / Close Call**

- Used to describe any variation, which did not affect the outcome, but for which a recurrence carries a significant chance of a serious outcome.

Example: Wrong medication is dispensed for a patient, but the error is identified before the patient received it.

Errors and Adverse Events

Medical Error



Negligent
adverse events

Potential
adverse events
Near Misses

Non-Preventable
adverse events



Adverse Events
(complications)



Human Error Models

- **Person**
 - Traditional approach
 - Unsafe acts, aberrant mental processes
 - Counter-measures directed at human behavior
- **System Approach**
 - Accepts fallibility
 - Errors consequences, not causes
 - System defenses

System v. Person

- Balance between system and person
- Help clinicians to be part of high-reliability organization
- Address human factors training
- Integrate people and technology

Dekker S. The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations. Ashgate Publishing, Limited. 2002, Burlington, VT.

Shapiro MJ, and Jay GD. "High Reliability Organizational Change for Hospitals: Translating Tenets for Medical Professionals." Qual Saf Health Care 2003; 12(4): 238-9.

Finally,
don't rely exclusively on new
technology making patients
safer.....

System Approach

- Advantages
 - Effect a Cultural Change
 - Enhances reporting
 - Identifies recurrent patterns
 - Promotes safeguards

Reason's Error Model





E = Institutional Context

ORGANIZATIONAL & CORPORATE CULTURE

CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS INFLUENCING PRACTICE

CARE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

DEFENSES / BARRIERS



LATENT FAILURES

ERROR & VIOLATION PRODUCING CONDITIONS

ACTIVE FAILURES

SYSTEM THINKING in other high risk industries

- **Aviation** - Zero deaths in 1998.
- **Anesthesia** - Deaths:

20 years ago	1 of 20,000
Today	1 of 200,000
- **Aluminum Refining (ALCOA)**

“You can’t make the safety better without having a profound understanding of the process.”

Error Management

- Lessons from High Reliability Organizations
 - Airlines fatality rate 0.27 per 1,000,000 departures
 - Serious medication errors 6.7 per 100 patients
- Human variability is desired
- Need to be preoccupied with failure
- Train for the eventual error
 - **Greater use of Simulation**

Your role?

- Seek non-technical safety education
 - Error Models and Process Improvement
 - Teamwork
 - Decision Making
 - Error Disclosure
- Identify and report incidents
- Participate in error disclosure
- Participate in local safety improvements and national goals (JCAHO)

Mandates for Reporting

JCAHO 2001 Standards

“Inform patients and, when appropriate, their families about the outcomes of care, including unanticipated outcomes”

<http://www.jointcommission.org>